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FROM ENRON TO WORLDCOM AND BEYOND: 
LIFE AND CRIME AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY† 
KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY* 
It all began with Enron. On October 16, 2001, Enron stunned Wall 
Street by announcing that it had a $618 million net loss for the third 
quarter and would reduce shareholder equity by $1.2 billion. October 16 
was a Tuesday. On Wednesday, the SEC opened an inquiry and made a 
written request for information from Enron officials. Friday, Enron 
notified its auditor, Arthur Andersen, that the SEC had initiated an inquiry 
into Enron’s financial accounting practices. Four days after that, 
Andersen’s Enron engagement team began wholesale destruction of 
Enron-related documents. 
Andersen and its lead partner on the Enron audit team now stand 
convicted of obstruction of justice,1 four former Enron executives have 
pled guilty to fraud charges,2 Enron’s Chief Financial Officer is under 
indictment and awaiting trial on ninety-eight counts of fraud and related 
offenses,3 Enron is bankrupt, and civil and criminal investigations 
 † Copyright 2003 by Kathleen F. Brickey. All rights reserved. 
 * James Carr Professor of Criminal Jurisprudence and Israel Treiman Faculty Fellow, 
Washington University in St. Louis. My sincere thanks to Jim Brickey, Steve Cutler, Troy Paredes and 
other participants in the F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Conference for their insightful 
comments and suggestions, and to Jonathan Linas and Christine Knickmeyer for their invaluable 
research assistance. 
 1. United States v. Duncan, CRH-02-209 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2002) (Information) (charging 
Andersen’s lead partner on the Enron engagement team with one count of obstruction of justice); 
United States v. Andersen, CRH 02-121 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2002) (Indictment) (charging Arthur 
Andersen with one count of obstruction of justice) (both on file with author). Mr. Duncan pled guilty, 
and Andersen was convicted after a six-week jury trial. For an analysis of the legal strategy Andersen 
pursued to avoid criminal prosecution, see Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall From Grace, 81:4 
WASH. U. L.Q. (2004) (forthcoming). 
 2. See United States v. Richter, CR-03-0026-MJJ (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2003) (Plea Agreement) 
(pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and to violating federal false statements statute); 
United States v. Lawyer, CRH 02-705 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2002) (Information) (charging former 
Enron executive with tax fraud); United States v. Kopper, CRH 02-0560 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2002) 
(Information) (charging Enron’s Managing Director for Global Finance with conspiracy to commit 
wire fraud and to commit money laundering); United States v. Belden, CR 02-0313 MJJ (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 17, 2002) (Information) (charging Enron former Vice President and Managing Director of Energy 
Trading with conspiracy to commit wire fraud) (all on file with author). 
 3. See United States v. Fastow, CRH-02-0665 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2003) (Superseding 
Indictment) (charging former Enron CFO with securities fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, 
obstruction of justice, tax fraud, and conspiracy; also charging former Enron Treasurer and former 
Enron Vice President in Global Finance with conspiracy, wire fraud, and money laundering). See also 
United States v. Fastow, CRH-03-150 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2003) (Indictment) (charging wife of former 
Enron CFO with conspiracy to defraud, money laundering conspiracy, and tax fraud); United States v. 
Rice, CRH-03-93-01 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2003) (Superseding Indictment) (charging seven broadband 
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continue to examine Enron’s complex accounting practices and byzantine 
financial schemes.  
Fascinating in its own right, the Enron-Andersen saga enjoyed 
prominent front page coverage in major papers for an extended period of 
time. In the beginning, it was widely assumed that the Enron scandal was 
an anomaly. But it soon became clear that this was anything but an 
isolated case of financial accounting fraud at a major corporation. Enron’s 
record largest bankruptcy in United States history was soon eclipsed by 
WorldCom, whose less sophisticated accounting fraud led to a larger 
restatement of earnings, a larger bankruptcy filing, and equally far-
reaching civil and criminal investigations.4  
Federal and state regulators have since initiated fraud investigations 
involving dozens of corporations, including Adelphia, HealthSouth, 
McKesson, Tyco, and Qwest. To date, some ninety corporate owners, 
executives, and employees have been criminally charged, and the 
investigations are ongoing.5 The enforcement net has also expanded to 
include detailed scrutiny of how investment banks and investment advisers 
may have contributed to these scandals, and the SEC and the Justice 
executives with securities fraud, false statements, wire fraud, conspiracy, and money laundering); 
United States v. Bermingham, CRH 02-0597 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2002) (Indictment) (charging three 
London bankers with wire fraud in scheme with two Enron executives to defraud a British bank) (all 
on file with author). 
 As of August, 2003, eighteen Enron executives and three British bankers had been criminally 
charged in connection with the fraud.  See infra APPENDIX A, MAJOR CORPORATE FRAUD 
PROSECUTIONS, March 2002 - August 2003.  
 4. When this Article went to press, five WorldCom executives and employees had been 
criminally charged in federal court. See United States v. Sullivan (indictment filed in United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York) (Aug. 28, 2002) (charging Scott Sullivan, 
WorldCom’s CFO, and Buford Yates, WorldCom’s Director of General Accounting, with conspiracy, 
securities fraud, and making false SEC filings); United States v. Myers, 02-CR-1261 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
25, 2002) (Information) (charging WorldCom Senior Vice President and Controller David Myers with 
conspiracy, securities fraud, and making false SEC filings); United States v. Vinson, 02-CR-1349 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) (Information) (charging employee with conspiracy and securities fraud); 
United States v. Normand (information filed in United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) (charging employee with conspiracy and securities fraud) (all on 
file with author). With the exception of Scott Sullivan, all of these defendants pled guilty. See infra 
text accompanying notes 66-73. Six months after his initial indictment, prosecutors added bank fraud 
to the list of charges against Mr. Sullivan. Kurt Eichenwald, New Charges Against Ex-WorldCom 
Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2003, at C2.  
 While this Article was in press, the Oklahoma Attorney General filed a fifteen count felony 
information in state court charging WorldCom and its former CEO, Bernard Ebbers, with criminal 
violations of state securities laws. The information also charged Sullivan, Myers, Vinson, and 
Normand with committing the same crimes. State v. WorldCom, Inc. (felony information filed in 
District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma) (Aug. 27, 2003) (on file with author). As of this 
writing, no federal criminal charges have been brought against WorldCom or Ebbers. 
 5. See infra APPENDIX A, MAJOR CORPORATE FRAUD PROSECUTIONS, March 2002 - August 
2003. 
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Department have begun to examine the role of lawyers and other 
professionals who may have turned a blind eye to obvious fraud. Enron 
was, quite simply, the opening chapter in a series of sordid tales about 
corporate governance run amuck.  
It was against this backdrop that zeal for corporate governance reform 
gained unexpected momentum and resulted in the surprisingly quick 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to correct systemic weaknesses in 
corporate governance structures. Sarbanes-Oxley’s goals include 
improving accounting oversight, strengthening auditor independence, 
requiring more transparency in corporate financial matters, eliminating 
analyst conflicts of interest, and requiring greater accountability from 
corporate officials. But Sarbanes-Oxley also augments prosecutorial tools 
available in major fraud cases by expanding statutory prohibitions against 
fraud and obstruction of justice, increasing criminal penalties for 
traditional fraud and cover-up crimes, and strengthening sentencing 
guidelines applicable to high-end frauds.  
Sarbanes-Oxley’s criminal provisions have not been particularly well 
received. Critics complain that they are needlessly redundant, rely too 
heavily on enhanced criminal penalties to achieve their goals, and attach 
far too much importance to filling minor gaps in the coverage of existing 
laws.6 Thus, some critics conclude that “[t]he significance of the new 
crimes and higher penalties is vastly overstated”7 and that Sarbanes-
Oxley’s criminal provisions are “more an expression of symbolic political 
outrage than they are a reasoned response to a public policy question.”8 
This Article presents the alternative view that the Act’s criminal 
provisions make significant strides toward piercing the veil of corporate 
silence. Part I of the article focuses on corporate whistleblowers and the 
important role they played in bringing the Enron and WorldCom scandals 
to light. On this front, Sarbanes-Oxley strengthens the legal protections 
accorded whistleblowers by extending existing criminal prohibitions 
against witness retaliation to include retaliatory acts that occur in the 
workplace setting. Part II looks at how federal prosecutors are building 
 6. See, e.g., Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the 
Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 676-89 (2002) 
(arguing that the Act’s new obstruction of justice and securities fraud crimes largely extend to conduct 
that was already criminal and that its increased penalties will have little deterrent effect) [hereinafter 
Perino]. 
 7. Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & Stephanie R. Pratt, Sarbanes-Oxley: New Ways to Solve Old Crimes, 
9 BUS. CRIMES BULL. No. 11, at 1 (Dec. 2002). 
 8. Id. See also Perino, supra note 6, at 673 (calling Sarbanes-Oxley’s criminal provisions “little 
more than political grandstanding”).  
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criminal fraud cases arising from the current corporate scandals and the 
crucial role that cooperating witnesses play. Part II also explores why 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s enhanced criminal penalties and the corresponding 
revisions to the federal sentencing guidelines are likely to provide 
powerful incentives for targets of criminal fraud investigations to help 
prosecutors build cases against other participants in the fraud. 
I. CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWERS 
A. Enron 
1. Sherron Watkins 
“I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting 
scandals.”9 Thus began Sherron Watkins’ odyssey from an obscure 
corporate whistleblower to one of Time Magazine’s Persons of the Year.10 
She voiced her concern about accounting irregularities in an anonymous 
memo to Enron’s Chairman, Ken Lay. The memo followed on the heels of 
the abrupt and puzzling departure of CEO Jeff Skilling for “personal 
reasons” after only six months on the job.11 Wall Street reacted badly to 
Skilling’s resignation, and Enron stock fell more than six percent, 
continuing a trend that had marked his brief tenure as CEO.12 
As rumors quickly spread among Enron employees and Wall Street 
analysts, Mr. Lay invited employees to submit their concerns in a 
comment box shortly after Skilling resigned.13 It was in response to these 
 9. Anonymous Memorandum from Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corporate 
Development, Enron, to Kenneth Lay, Chairman, Enron (Aug. 15, 2001) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Anonymous Watkins Memorandum]. 
 10. Ms. Watkins shared the cover of Time with two other whistleblowers, including WorldCom’s 
Cynthia Cooper. 
 11. ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON 293 (2002) 
[hereinafter PIPE DREAMS]. 
 12. Id. at 294. Enron’s stock declined by almost half during Skilling’s tenure as CEO. 
 13. Jodie Morse & Amanda Bower, The Party Crasher, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002/Jan. 6, 2003, 53, at 
55 [hereinafter The Party Crasher]. Mr. Lay solicited questions to address at an upcoming all-
employee meeting to discuss Skilling’s departure. The Financial Collapse of Enron—Part 3: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
107th Cong. 15-16 (2003) (testimony of Sherron Watkins) [hereinafter House Hearing]. 
 Mr. Lay joined Enron as its CEO in 1984. PETER C. FUSARO & ROSS M. MILLER, WHAT WENT 
WRONG AT ENRON 1 (2002) [hereinafter WHAT WENT WRONG]. He stepped down in February of 2001 
when Skilling assumed the post, but Lay remained Chairman of the Board. Id. at 174. After Skilling’s 
abrupt resignation, Lay assumed the CEO post again. Id. at 176. Lay resigned on January 23, 2002, 
following Enron’s bankruptcy, the initiation of a Justice Department criminal investigation into Enron, 
and the sale of Enron’s energy trading business for a song. Id. at 178. 
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events that Sherron Watkins—an Enron Vice-President who reported to 
CFO Andy Fastow—warned Ken Lay about “an elaborate accounting 
hoax.”14 By then Watkins knew that Enron’s assets were artificially 
inflated.  She also thought that Skilling knew the accounting problems 
could not be fixed and that he “would rather abandon ship now than resign 
in shame in two years.”15  
Shortly after sending the memo, Watkins met with Ken Lay. At that 
meeting, she provided five new memos that both detailed problems with 
Enron’s off-book partnerships and special purpose entities and suggested a 
strategy for disclosing the accounting irregularities, restating third quarter 
earnings, and rebuilding investor confidence.16 She also encouraged Lay to 
engage an independent law firm to conduct a preliminary investigation 
into the accounting problems17 and urged him not to retain Vinson & 
Elkins because it had helped structure some of the questionable deals.18 He 
agreed to investigate her concerns19 but gave Vinson & Elkins the nod.20 
The law firm conducted a brief and limited investigation into the 
allegations21 and—to no one’s surprise—reported that the special purpose 
entity transactions were not problematic.22 Ironically, the report came just 
 14. Anonymous Watkins Memorandum, supra note 9. Ms. Watkins, Enron’s Vice President of 
Corporate Development and a CPA, began her career as an auditor at Arthur Andersen. House 
Hearing, supra note 13, at 14-15. 
 15. House Hearing, supra note 13, at 14-15; PIPE DREAMS, supra note 11, at 294. 
 16. Memorandum from Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corporate Development, Enron, to 
Kenneth Lay, Chairman, Enron (Aug. 22, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Watkins Strategy 
Memorandum]; House Hearing, supra note 13, at 16. 
 17. Watkins Strategy Memorandum, supra note 16; House Hearing, supra note 13, at 19-20. 
 18. House Hearing, supra note 13, at 19-20; PIPE DREAMS, supra note 11, at 298. Vinson & 
Elkins, the law firm that did much of Enron’s work over the years, billed the corporation $30 
million—or seven percent of the firm’s total billings—in 2001. PIPE DREAMS, supra note 11, at 298. 
 19. House Hearing, supra note 13, at 16. 
 20. PIPE DREAMS, supra note 11, at 298; The Party Crasher, supra note 13, at 55. Ms. Watkins 
would later call Mr. Lay’s reliance on Vinson & Elkins and Arthur Andersen to review their own work 
a serious mistake. Memorandum from Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corporate Development, 
Enron, to Elizabeth Tilney, Senior Vice President for Advertising, Communications and Organization 
Development, Enron (Oct. 30, 2001) (on file with author). 
 21. The law firm’s report states that Enron’s General Counsel had limited the investigation by 
instructing Vinson & Elkins not to second guess Arthur Andersen’s treatment of underlying 
accounting issues, not to do a detailed analysis of the transactions in question, and not to conduct a 
discovery-style investigation. House Hearing, supra note 13, at 20. See also Letter from Mark 
Hendrick III, Partner, Vinson & Elkins L.L.P., to James V. Derrick, Jr., Executive Vice President and 
General Counsel, Enron, Re: Preliminary Investigation of Allegations of an Anonymous Employee 1-2 
(Oct. 15, 2001), reprinted in id. at 142-43 [hereinafter Vinson & Elkins Report]. The report also stated 
that contrary to Watkins’ recommendation, Enron’s General Counsel had decided not to hire an 
independent accountant. Id. 
 22. House Hearing, supra note 13, at 20; Vinson & Elkins Report, supra note 21, at 8-9, 
reprinted in House Hearing, at 149-50. The report characterized any potential concerns with the 
transactions as primarily “bad cosmetics.” Vinson & Elkins Report, supra note 21, at 9, reprinted in 
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days before Enron announced its third quarter loss of more than $500 
million and its $1 billion write-down in shareholder equity.23 Three 
months later, Enron filed for bankruptcy.  
Sherron Watkins never brought her concerns to Enron’s board or the 
SEC,24 but she provided devastating testimony at congressional hearings 
that probed into Enron’s collapse.25 During a pre-hearing review of 
subpoenaed Enron documents, she came across a telling e-mail from a 
Vinson & Elkins lawyer to Enron’s Assistant General Counsel. Bearing 
the subject line “Confidential Employee Matter,” the message read in 
pertinent part:  
Per your request the following are some bullet thoughts on how to 
manage the case with the employee who made the sensitive report.  
. . . .  
You . . . asked that I include in this communication a summary of 
the possible risks associated with discharging (or constructively 
discharging) employees who report allegations of improper 
accounting practices:  
1. Texas law does not currently protect corporate whistle-blowers. 
The Supreme Court has twice declined to create a cause of action 
for whistle-blowers who are discharged.  
. . . .  
4. In addition to the risk of a wrongful discharge claim, there is the 
risk that the discharged employee will seek to convince some 
government oversight agency (e.g., IRS, SEC, etc.) that the 
corporation has engaged in materially misleading reporting or is 
otherwise non-compliant. As with wrongful discharge claims, this 
House Hearing, at 150. 
 23. E-mail from Carl Jordan, Attorney and Member, Vinson & Elkins, to Sharon Butcher, Staff 
Attorney, Enron, Re: Confidential Employee Matter (Aug. 24, 2001) [hereinafter Jordan E-mail] (on 
file with author); PIPE DREAMS, supra note 11, at 298; House Hearing, supra note 13, at 64.  
 24. She later regretted her naiveté in believing that reporting the fraud to top management would 
resolve the crisis and wished she had brought her concerns to higher authority. The Party Crasher, 
supra note 13, at 54. From the perspective of her staunchest critics, her efforts were flawed not only 
because she failed to inform federal regulators about the fraud, but also because she failed to confront 
Skilling and Fastow or even to go to Enron’s board. Wendy Zellner, Was Sherron Watkins Really So 
Selfless?, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 16, 2002, at 110; WHAT WENT WRONG, supra note 13, at 142.  
 25. See House Hearing, supra note 13, at 14-67. 
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can create problems even tho [sic] the allegations have no merit 
whatsoever.26 
The message was dated just two days after Watkins met with Ken Lay.  
The e-mail served as a stark reminder that, as a general matter, 
whistleblowers are underappreciated by corporate managers.27 Bearing 
that observation out, Andy Fastow was furious that Watkins had talked to 
Ken Lay. Upon learning that she had, he told Watkins’ direct supervisor 
that he wanted Watkins “out of here tonight” and seized the laptop 
computer from her desk.28 Despite the heated rhetoric, Watkins remained 
an Enron Vice-President.  But she was reassigned from her executive suite 
to a starkly furnished office 33 floors below and relegated to performing 
make-work tasks.29 The environment was so tense that she even sought 
 26. Jordan E-mail, supra note 23; The Party Crasher, supra note 13, at 53. 
 27. As Senator Charles Grassley (a Sherron Watkins fan) quipped, a corporate employee who 
blows the whistle is as about as welcome “as a skunk at a picnic.” Paula Dwyer & Dan Carrey, Year of 
the Whistleblower, BUS. WK., Dec. 16, 2002, 107, at 108 [hereinafter Whistleblower] (quoting Senator 
Charles Grassley).  
 The current dispute over the credibility of James Krutchen, a former employee of Onvoy, is 
another case in point. Krutchen was the whistleblower who alleged that MCI and other telecom 
companies committed fraud by improperly routing phone calls to avoid access fees they owed other 
phone companies. Janice Aune, Onvoy’s President and CEO, attacked Krutchen’s credibility and 
publicly released his personnel record to discredit him. She portrayed him as a disgruntled employee 
who was fired because of his poor performance record and justified the release of personnel 
information on the ground that Onvoy had become “the victim of corporate terrorism.” Stephen 
Labaton, Credibility of Witness is Challenged in MCI Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2003, at B1. See 
also Yochi J. Dreazen, Views Diverge on Credibility of MCI Informer, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2003, at 
B1. 
 28. PIPE DREAMS, supra note 11, at 298. Several executives were alarmed by Mr. Fastow’s 
reaction. House Hearing, supra note 13, at 18-19. Although he seized her computer, another superior 
promptly replaced it and allowed Watkins to transfer files from the hard drive of the confiscated 
laptop. Id. at 19. 
 29. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002/Jan. 6, 2003, 
30, at 33. See also MIMI SWARTZ, POWER FAILURE 300-01, 321-25 (2003) [hereinafter POWER 
FAILURE]. Ms. Watkins was transferred from the corporate development group to the human resources 
group. House Hearing, supra note 13, at 15. She testified that she asked to be transferred because she 
was no longer comfortable reporting directly to Fastow. Id. at 16. See also Jordan E-mail, supra note 
23 (memorandum from outside lawyer stating that Ms. Watkins’ request for reassignment was “a 
positive”). 
 Ms. Watkins later wrote that “I haven’t really had a real job since my first meeting with Ken re: 
these matters in late August.” Memorandum from Sherron Watkins to Elizabeth Tilney, Senior Vice 
President for Advertising, Communications and Organization Development, Enron (Oct. 30, 2001) (on 
file with author) (offering to assist in devising a viable public relations strategy to deal with Enron’s 
crisis). 
 Sherron Watkins was not the only employee whose skepticism about Enron’s finances resulted in 
de facto demotion. Keith Power was an Enron manager who monitored the Enron stock held in JEDI, a 
special purpose entity, and supervised JEDI’s routine debt administration. After an executive told him 
about a negative Enron story posted on a Web site, Power delved more deeply and discovered that the 
story was based on a longer proprietary report prepared by a highly respected stock analyst. Power 
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advice from Enron security personnel.30 
Fastow’s angry reaction and Vinson & Elkins’ e-mail clearly 
demonstrate that Enron managers did not welcome the opportunity to take 
corrective action. They knew they had a big problem, and they wanted it to 
go away. But the “it” was less the accounting issues than it was the vice-
president who brought them to light.  
2. Sarbanes-Oxley 
Because she had an insider’s perspective into Enron’s labyrinthine 
accounting maneuvers, Sherron Watkins was able to provide a roadmap 
for a highly complex financial fraud investigation.31 But it takes courage to 
do that.32 Whistleblowers have historically been at risk of being labeled 
called the analyst, who faxed him the 30 page report and gave him permission to show it around the 
company. The upshot of the report was that the analyst thought that Enron stock was overvalued, that 
he questioned the quality of earnings, and that he was troubled that senior Enron executives were 
selling their Enron stock.  
 The report confirmed what Power already suspected, and he gave copies to several executives he 
worked with. Two days later, Power’s boss told him that he “shouldn’t have distributed” the report, not 
to give it to anyone else, and to forget that he ever saw it. POWER FAILURE, supra note 29, at 257-59. 
Three days later, Power was transferred to another group with a less desirable assignment. He was 
snubbed by his superiors, given relatively little meaningful work, and was ultimately demoted despite 
high marks from his peers. Id. at 307-08. 
 30. The Party Crasher, supra note 13, at 53. See also House Hearing, supra note 13, at 49-50, 
62. Although she had not been threatened with physical harm, she was concerned that her superiors 
might be vindictive and that she had very little support. “I did feel like I was a little bit of a lone fish 
swimming upstream, and so it starts to wear on you that it’s you against them. . . .” Id. at 62. Perhaps 
the underlying assumption was that if you make life unpleasant enough for the whistleblower, you may 
not have to fire her. She may leave on her own volition.  
 31. Whistleblower, supra note 27, at 107. While working for Fastow, Watkins’ responsibilities 
included reviewing and valuing all assets that Enron considered selling. In the course of doing this, she 
learned that hedged losses incurred by one of the special purpose entities were transferred to Enron. 
She was “alarmed” by the explanations she received and found them contrary to her understanding of 
accounting principles. But despite her efforts to clarify the situation, she found no reassuring answers. 
House Hearing, supra note 13, at 15. 
 Despite her central role in revealing the fraud, the Powers Committee—a special committee of the 
Enron Board charged with conducting an internal investigation—did not contact Ms. Watkins until late 
December, when the Committee’s work was almost done. House Hearing, supra note 13, at 51. 
Although she and her newly retained lawyer met with the Committee a week after the Committee’s 
request, they told the Committee they would need to reschedule so her lawyer could get up to speed. 
Id. Apart from references in the Committee’s report that described the time line of Ms. Watkins’s 
revelation of the fraud, the only reference to her is a footnote statement that “Watkins, through her 
counsel, declined to be interviewed by us.” Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative 
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corporation 172 n.81 (Feb., 1, 2002), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/legz/news/lit/enron/. Taken out of context, the report disingenuously implies a 
lack of cooperation on her part.  
 32. Representative John Dingell called Watkins “an extraordinary, courageous woman, who has 
been a bright spot in an otherwise sorry and outrageous saga.” WHAT WENT WRONG, supra note 13, at 
142. See also House Hearing, supra note 13, at 55 (remarks of Representative Gene Green) 
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troublemakers. Even the House Subcommittee that so eagerly sought her 
testimony gave the term “whistleblower” a negative connotation. “Ms. 
Watkins is not a whistleblower in the conventional sense. She was and is a 
loyal company employee.”33 The implication, of course, is that most 
whistleblowers are not.  
Apart from the very real risk of being shunned by co-workers as 
disloyal tattletales, whistleblowers are often demoted, fired, or even 
blackballed by an entire industry.34 A random review of 200 whistleblower 
complaints filed with the National Whistleblower Center in 2002 found 
that about half of the complainants said they were fired after they reported 
misconduct.35 The remaining complainants had been subjected to other 
retaliatory action such as on-the-job harassment or discipline. A survey by 
another watchdog group, the Government Accountability Project, found 
that about ninety percent of whistleblowers are subjected to reprisals or 
threats.36  
In recognition of the crucial role that corporate whistleblowers play,37 
Sarbanes-Oxley endeavors to reverse this trend by providing them 
significant legal protection.38 In addition to creating civil remedies for 
(expressing respect and admiration for Watkins’ courage in putting her job on the line by reporting her 
concerns to the CEO). 
 33. House Hearing, supra note 13, at 3 (remarks of Representative James Greenwood).  
 34. Whistleblower, supra note 27, at 108. Indeed, Ms. Watkins said she believed that confronting 
either Mr. Skilling or Mr. Fastow would have been a “job terminating move.” House Hearing, supra 
note 13, at 15. Cf. id. at 52 (cautioning Ms. Watkins that if her cooperation with the Committee’s 
investigation had adverse repercussions at Enron, she should let the Committee know); id. at 61 
(asking Ms. Watkins to inform the Committee promptly of any threatened retaliation resulting from 
her testimony or her reporting the fraud to Ken Lay). 
 35. National Whistleblower Center, The National Status of Whistleblower Protection on Labor 
Day, 2002 (Sept. 2, 2002) (unpaginated) (on file with author). Of these 200 cases, the largest category 
of wrongdoing the whistleblowers reported consisted of fraud or other criminal misconduct. The 
whistleblowers’ employment status ran the gamut from corporate executives to maintenance 
employees. 
 This study does not purport to be scientific. It is a random survey of cases in which individual 
whistleblowers had complained about retaliatory treatment. Thus, while the self-selection bias inherent 
in the study would not pass scientific muster, it nonetheless sheds anecdotal light on the perils of 
whistleblowing. 
 36. Gail Russell Chaddock, Enron Changes Climate for Whistle-Blowers, THE CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 1, 2002, at 5 [hereinafter Enron Changes Climate].  
 37. “We learned from Sherron Watkins of Enron that these corporate insiders are the key 
witnesses that need to be encouraged to report fraud and help prove it in court.” The Truth Is Out 
There, LEGAL WK. (Aug. 20, 2002), at http://www.legalweek.net/ViewItem.asp?id=10241 (quoting 
Senator Patrick Leahy). 
 According to a recent study, thirty-six percent of frauds and other economic crimes against 
businesses are reported by whistleblowers. Jonathan D. Glater, Survey Finds Fraud’s Reach in Big 
Business, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2003, at C3. 
 38. Unlike Sarbanes-Oxley’s civil whistleblowing provisions, which only protect employees of 
publicly traded companies, the criminal provision applies to harmful retaliatory acts toward any 
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employee retaliation in fraud cases,39 Sarbanes-Oxley makes it a felony to 
take any action that is harmful to any person in retaliation for providing 
information about a federal crime to law enforcement officials.40 The 
“harm” element includes, but is not limited to, interference with another’s 
lawful employment or livelihood.41 Thus, a retaliatory firing or demotion 
witness or informant. 
 39. The civil whistleblower provision forbids publicly traded companies and their officers and 
agents from discharging, demoting, suspending, threatening, harassing, or otherwise discriminating 
against an employee in retaliation for the employee’s providing information about securities fraud, 
mail and wire fraud, or bank fraud to a federal regulator or investigator, to members of Congress, to a 
corporate supervisor, or to anyone working for the corporation who has the authority to investigate or 
terminate misconduct. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (West Supp. 2003). The civil statute also prohibits 
retaliating because the employee participated or assisted in a proceeding relating to securities fraud, 
mail and wire fraud, or bank fraud. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(b) (West Supp. 2003). 
 A whistleblower may seek relief by filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor within 90 days 
of the retaliatory act and may file suit in federal court if the Secretary does not issue a final decision 
within 180 days after the complaint is filed. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(c) (West Supp. 2003). The statute 
authorizes recovery of compensatory damages including reinstatement, back pay, and special damages 
such as the cost of litigating the claim, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1514A(d) (West Supp. 2003). The Labor Department received more than 110 whistleblower 
complaints in the first 14 months after this provision became law. Laurie P. Cohen, Quattrone Trial: 
New Template?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2003, at C1. 
 Another civil provision requires audit committees of public companies to establish procedures for 
handling employee complaints about auditing and internal accounting issues. Among other things, the 
committee must protect whistleblowers by establishing procedures for the submission of confidential, 
anonymous concerns about such matters. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m)(4) (West Supp. 2003). Rejecting a 
“one size fits all” approach, SEC regulations implementing this provision give audit committees 
discretion to adopt procedures they deem appropriate in light of the particular circumstances or needs 
of the company. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 50,379 (Apr. 
16, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249, 274). 
 40. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(e) (West Supp. 2003). The term “law enforcement officer” means federal 
officers and employees who are legally authorized to investigate or prosecute an offense. 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1515(a)(4) (West Supp. 2003). Section 1513(e) is an amendment to a witness retaliation provision in 
the Victim and Witness Protection Act that punishes the use or threat of violence against person or 
property in retaliation for another person’s cooperation with federal law enforcement officials. 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1513(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(b) (West Supp. 2003). 
 The criminal statute applies whenever the whistleblower reports evidence of any federal crime, 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1513(e) (West Supp. 2003), while the protections of the civil whistleblower statute are 
triggered only when the employee reports possible securities fraud, mail and wire fraud, or bank fraud. 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a)(1) (West Supp. 2003). See supra note 39. 
 41. The statute is not a model of clarity. Unlike its counterparts in subsections (a) and (b), the 
whistleblower protection provision is ambiguous on the question whether it protects against retaliatory 
actions that harm third persons. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003) and 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1513(b) (West Supp. 2003) (prohibiting causing, attempting to cause, or threatening to 
cause death, bodily injury, or property damage to another person with intent to retaliate against any 
person for his cooperation as a witness or informant) with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(e) (West Supp. 2003) 
(prohibiting taking action that is harmful to any person with intent to retaliate for providing truthful 
information to law enforcement officers but failing to specify toward whom the retaliatory intent must 
be directed). See 3 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 12:23 (2d ed. Supp. 
2002). 
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would constitute a crime.42  
The statute prohibits retaliating against those who voluntarily come 
forward to report suspected criminal activity as well as those who are 
sought out by federal investigators. Thus, regardless of whether someone 
like Sherron Watkins contacted the SEC about Enron’s accounting fraud 
or whether SEC investigators contacted her as part of an ongoing probe, 
any harmful act in retaliation for her cooperation would be felonious. 
This provision fills a major loophole in the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act, whose witness retaliation prohibitions previously applied 
only to violence or threats of violence.43 By extending the prohibition to 
any harmful act, Sarbanes-Oxley significantly strengthens the legal 
protections accorded federal witnesses and informants.44 That said, it is 
nonetheless important to recognize the statute’s inherent limitations.  
Sherron Watkins reported what she knew to Enron’s Chairman. The 
Vinson & Elkins e-mail about managing the “confidential employee 
matter” made it clear that within two days after she met with Ken Lay, 
Enron executives were considering all available options. If they had fired 
her on the spot, they would not have violated the witness retaliation statute 
because she had yet to tell law enforcement officials what she knew.45 
Thus, even though Sarbanes-Oxley fills an important gap in the criminal 
law, Sherron Watkins’ whistleblowing had not gone far enough to trigger 
 42. Other means of wrongfully interfering with the whistleblower’s livelihood could include 
reorganizing the company to eliminate her job, spreading false rumors that impair her reputation, 
causing the denial or revocation of an essential business or professional license, blacklisting her in the 
industry, or falsely accusing her of a crime. But the statute is not limited to retaliation that causes 
economic harm. In consequence, it is possible that intentionally inflicting intangible harms like 
emotional distress could be prohibited as well.  
 This is in marked contrast with the civil whistleblower provision, which is limited to 
discrimination against the employee “in terms and conditions of employment.” 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1514A(a) (West Supp. 2003). See supra note 39. 
 43. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(b) (West Supp. 
2003) (punishing, respectively, killing or attempting to kill a witness or informant to prevent him from 
participating in an official proceeding, and using or threatening to use intimidation or physical force to 
prevent a witness or informant from participating in an official proceeding).  
 44. The witness retaliation statute, § 1513, is one of dozens of federal offenses enumerated as 
RICO predicate crimes. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1) (West Supp. 2003). Because the whistleblower 
provision amends § 1513, retaliation against a corporate whistleblower can be part of a RICO pattern 
of racketeering activity in a criminal prosecution or a civil RICO suit brought by private litigants. See 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5), § 1963, § 1964(c) (West 2000). Section 1513 is also a predicate crime under 
the money laundering statutes. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956(a)(1) (West 2000); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(7) 
(West Supp. 2003); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1957 (a), (f)(3) (West 2000). 
 45. In contrast, the civil whistleblower provision more broadly protects not only employees who 
report fraud to federal regulators and investigators but also extends its protections to employees who 
report to a corporate supervisor, assist members of Congress, or participate or assist in a legal 
proceeding. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (West Supp. 2003). See supra note 39. 
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its protections.46 It was only after she was subpoenaed that she told 
outsiders what she knew.47 
But there is another lingering question as well. After Sarbanes-Oxley, 
would Sherron Watkins have been more likely to bypass the corporate 
chain of command and report the fraud directly to the SEC? It is not so 
clear that she would. It is understandable that she would bring Enron’s 
accounting problems to the attention of her superiors before going to the 
SEC.48 First, she feared that public disclosure of her concerns would 
hasten Enron’s demise.49 She worried that if she went outside the 
corporate chain of command, management would lose the opportunity to 
thoroughly examine the problem and “try to fix it calmly.”50 Second, she 
believed Ken Lay was “a man of integrity.”51 She might reasonably expect 
that if she gave him evidence of massive fraud, he would do whatever it 
took to clean it up. Indeed, she believed that by going to Ken Lay she 
would hand him “his leadership moment.”52 But that was not to be. His 
efforts to address Ms. Watkins’ concerns—however sincere—were 
lukewarm and ineffective at best.53  
Thus, it is far from clear that Sarbanes-Oxley’s prohibition against 
witness retaliation would induce a Sherron Watkins to take action that she 
feared would doom the corporation and put the livelihoods of thousands of 
 46. She would have been protected under the civil whistleblower provision, which extends to 
corporate employees who report suspected wrongdoing to a supervisor. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) 
(West Supp. 2003). See supra note 39. 
 47.  The first week in January she received an SEC subpoena ordering her to produce, within 
seven days, three years worth of Enron bank records and all Enron records and stock records. The SEC 
also wanted to interview her during that same time frame. POWER FAILURE, supra note 29, at 344. 
 48. Ironically, her chain of command approach was consistent with the approach taken by the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which—among other things—specifically addressed 
how independent public auditors should initially respond if they detect possible illegal acts while 
performing a required audit of an issuer’s financial statements. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(b)(1)(B) (West 
Supp. 2003) (requiring the auditor, as soon as is practicable, to “inform the appropriate level of the 
management” and to assure that the audit committee or the board of directors is also informed unless 
the illegal act is “inconsequential”). 
 49. House Hearing, supra note 13, at 50-51. 
 50. Id. at 51.  
 51. Id. at 49. 
 52. The Party Crasher, supra note 13, at 54. 
 53. Ms. Watkins believed that Ken Lay and the board had been “dupe[d]” by Skilling and 
Fastow, House Hearing, supra note 13, at 21, and that Mr. Lay should not bear full responsibility for 
the accounting mess. Memorandum from Sherron Watkins to Elizabeth Tilney, Senior Vice President 
for Advertising, Communications and Organization Development, Enron (Oct. 30, 2001) (attachment) 
(on file with author) (stating that if Mr. Lay did not act to clean up the mess, the worst would happen, 
and he would bear a disproportionate share of the blame). Ms. Watkins also testified that even after she 
informed Mr. Lay of the special purpose entity problem, he did not fully understand the seriousness of 
the issue. House Hearing, supra note 13, at 23. 
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people at risk.54 She reported her concerns to Ken Lay because he was the 
one person in authority whom she thought she could trust.55 Lay had the 
power to take corrective action, and he assured her that he would.  
But there is also another dynamic at work. During Ms. Watkins’ 
meeting with Ken Lay, he inquired whether she had talked to the SEC or 
the press. When she said she had not, he asked her to refrain from going 
public until he had time to investigate.56 A reasonable request? Presumably 
so, and she readily agreed. After all, Ms. Watkins had achieved what she 
had boldly set out to accomplish—or so she was led to believe.  
B. WorldCom 
1. Cynthia Cooper 
The circumstances under which WorldCom’s fraud was brought to 
light are dishearteningly similar to Sherron Watkins’ tale. Like Ms. 
Watkins, Cynthia Cooper—WorldCom’s Vice President for Internal 
Auditing—also sought to expose and correct a massive accounting fraud. 
Her suspicions arose when a concerned official in the wireless division 
told her the accounting department had taken $400 million from his 
reserve account and used it to inflate WorldCom’s income. She first raised 
the issue with Arthur Andersen, WorldCom’s accounting firm. Although 
Andersen insisted that everything was fine, she continued to press on—
notwithstanding that her boss, CFO Scott Sullivan, angrily told her to back 
off.57  
Concerned by Sullivan’s hostility and worried about the reliability of 
Andersen’s audits, Cooper and her accounting team secretly conducted an 
extensive review of the books, working at night and copying data to a CD 
to prevent it from being destroyed. Within a few months they learned that 
in 2001, billions of dollars in ordinary operating costs had been 
improperly recorded as capital expenditures, thus disguising a $662 
million loss as a $2.4 billion profit.58 When Scott Sullivan discovered that 
Cooper’s team was auditing Andersen’s work, he asked her to suspend the 
review. But Cooper refused to yield.59  
 54. House Hearing, supra note 13, at 50. 
 55. Ms. Watkins testified that she believed she could bring her concerns to him, but not to Jeff 
Skilling. Id. at 49. 
 56. Id. at 50-51. 
 57. Amanda Ripley, The Night Detective, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002/Jan. 6, 2003, 44, at 46-47. 
 58. Id. at 47. 
 59. Id.  
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Instead, she went to the head of the board’s audit committee the 
following day. To its credit, the committee did the right thing. Within little 
more than a week, the audit committee convened a meeting in which all 
sides of the issue were fully aired. When all was said and done, the 
committee found Sullivan’s explanation of the unorthodox accounting 
practices unpersuasive and concluded that they could not be justified. The 
committee then told Sullivan and Controller David Myers that if they did 
not resign, the board would fire them the next day.60 
2. Sarbanes-Oxley 
Why didn’t Cynthia Cooper go to the SEC? It must be hard to blow the 
whistle on your mentors. It must be harder still to report that they might 
have committed crimes. And up until the last minute, Cynthia Cooper had 
hoped that someone could provide a reasonable explanation for the 
accounting errors she had found.61  
Thus, as with Enron, it remains to be seen whether Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
whistleblower protections would provide a sufficient incentive to cause a 
Cynthia Cooper—a “loyal corporate employee”—to bypass the normal 
chain of command. Yet even if no one came forward on their own, the 
whistleblower statute could lead to felony penalties for firing or demoting 
any corporate employee interviewed by the SEC, the FBI, or the Justice 
Department in retaliation for providing information regarding criminal 
wrongdoing in the organization. That is a significant change in the law. 
II. COOPERATING WITNESSES 
A. Adelphia Communications 
“I deeply regret my participation in this fraud. . . . I knew at that time 
that what I was doing was wrong, and that I should have walked out rather 
than agree to participate.”62 These are the words of Timothy Werth, 
Adelphia’s Director of Accounting. He spoke them in federal court as he 
pled guilty to conspiracy and securities fraud charges arising out of a $2.5 
 60. Myers resigned but Sullivan did not, so the board dismissed him as promised. Id. at 49. 
Myers has since pled guilty to conspiracy, securities fraud, and filing false statements with the SEC. 
As of this writing, Sullivan is awaiting trial on similar criminal charges. 
 61. After going to the audit committee, she and her audit team remained hopeful that they could 
find something they might have missed that would explain the unorthodox accounting. But Cooper’s 
hopes were dashed when she confronted WorldCom Controller David Meyers, who conceded that the 
entries could not be justified. Id. at 47. 
 
 62. Former Adelphia Executive Enters a Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at E3. 
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billion accounting scandal that led to Adelphia’s bankruptcy. The plea 
hearing marked the beginning of his formal participation as a cooperating 
witness in the Adelphia criminal investigation. Two months earlier, James 
Brown, Adelphia’s Vice President for Finance, also pled guilty to fraud 
and conspiracy and agreed to help the government build its case.63  
Werth’s and Brown’s agreements to become cooperating witnesses are 
significant because four other Adelphia executives had already been 
indicted and were then awaiting trial. Notably, at least three of the four 
were far bigger fish than either Werth or Brown. They included John 
Rigas, the President and Chairman of the Board; Timothy Rigas, the Chief 
Financial Officer and Chairman of the Board’s Audit Committee; Michael 
Rigas, the Executive Vice President for Operations; and Michael 
Mulcahey, the Director of Internal Reporting. The indictment charged the 
four with conspiracy, securities fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud.64 It 
alleged that the President had looted the company on a “massive scale” 
and that he and his family had used Adelphia as their “personal piggy 
bank.”65 
Mr. Brown’s plea implicated all four of the executives in criminal 
wrongdoing, and Mr. Werth admitted that he conspired with the CFO and 
others. Their cooperation will thus provide invaluable assistance to the 
government in building its case against the other four executives, both 
during the investigation and at their trial. But it is equally important that 
Werth and Brown may also be poised to provide the government with 
leads about other possible participants in the fraud. 
B. WorldCom 
The WorldCom investigation also yielded important cooperating 
witnesses. The government first indicted Scott Sullivan—a CPA and 
WorldCom’s CFO, Treasurer, and Secretary—and Buford Yates, also a 
CPA and WorldCom’s Director of General Accounting.66 The indictment 
 63. Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Executive Pleads Guilty and Accuses Adelphia’s Founder, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 15, 2002, at C7. Mr. Brown pled guilty to conspiracy, bank fraud and securities fraud charges. 
 64. United States v. Rigas (indictment filed in United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York) (Sept. 23, 2002) (on file with author). The substance of the allegations is that 
the four executives engaged in a scheme to deprive Adelphia and its shareholders of the right to the 
honest services of its directors and officers, to violate fiduciary duties to the company and its 
shareholders, and to fraudulently obtain Adelphia’s money or property. Id. at 13. The bank fraud 
counts allege false representations made in credit agreements involving more than $4 billion.  
 65. Id.  
 66. United States v. Sullivan (indictment filed in United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York) (Aug. 28, 2002) (on file with author). 
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charged them with conspiring to inflate WorldCom’s earnings, committing 
securities fraud, and making false filings with the SEC. Mr. Yates later 
pled guilty to the conspiracy and securities fraud charges and agreed to 
cooperate with the investigation. At his plea hearing, he said he committed 
the crimes on orders from the “highest levels” of senior management.67 
The Sullivan indictment also named three unindicted co-conspirators as 
participants in the scheme. They were: David Myers, a CPA and 
WorldCom’s Senior Vice President and Controller, and Betty Vinson and 
Troy Normand, both WorldCom accounting officials who worked under 
Yates’ supervision. After Yates entered his guilty plea, Myers, Vinson, 
and Normand were charged in separate prosecutions with conspiracy and 
securities fraud.68 Myers was also charged with submitting false SEC 
filings.  
In contrast with the prosecution of Sullivan and Yates, the cases against 
Myers, Vinson, and Normand were initiated by the filing of a criminal 
information rather than an indictment.69 All three pled guilty on the day 
the information was filed, and in each case a cooperation agreement was 
part of the plea bargain. At separate plea hearings, Vinson and Normand 
stated that they were obeying orders from their supervisors—including 
Scott Sullivan—to cook WorldCom’s books.70 At his plea hearing, Myers 
informed the court that he was told by “senior management” to falsify 
WorldCom’s books to inflate reported earnings.71 
The potential value of these plea agreements is obvious. All four 
cooperating defendants implicated Scott Sullivan in the fraud and can be 
called to testify at his trial. The prospect that Myers might provide 
damaging testimony against his former boss puts enormous pressure on 
Sullivan.72 But the plea agreements are important in the continuing 
 67. Robert F. Worth, Ex-Official Of WorldCom Pleads Guilty To Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2002, at C9; Jerry Markon, WorldCom’s Yates Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2002, at A3.   
 68. United States v. Myers, 02-CR-1261 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2002) (Information); United States 
v. Vinson, 02 CR-1349 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) (Information); United States v. Normand 
(information filed in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York) (Oct. 10, 
2002) (all on file with author); 2 Ex-Officials of WorldCom Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, 
at C10. 
 69. The filing of a criminal information is a less formal way to proceed than presenting the case 
to a grand jury and seeking the return of an indictment. In federal court, the Constitution prohibits 
bringing a defendant to trial for a felony offense without an indictment unless the defendant waives the 
right to a grand jury proceeding. U.S. CONST., Amend. V. 
 70. 2 Ex-Officials of WorldCom Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at C10. 
 71. Former Controller of WorldCom Pleads Guilty to Fraud Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
2002, at C2; Deborah Solomon, WorldCom’s Ex-Controller Pleads Guilty to Fraud, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 27, 2002, at A3. 
 72. Deborah Solomon, WorldCom’s Ex-Controller Pleads Guilty to Fraud, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
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investigation as well. The cooperation of these witnesses is likely to 
intensify the government’s scrutiny of other senior managers to determine 
who among them may have participated in or approved the plan to crudely 
inflate WorldCom’s revenues.73 Thus, by the time all is said and done, it is 
possible that criminal charges will be filed against other WorldCom 
officials as well.  
C. Cooperation Agreements 
Like whistleblowers, cooperating witnesses play essential roles in 
investigations and prosecutions arising out of the corporate accounting 
fraud scandals, in part due to the nature of the underlying crimes. Enron, 
WorldCom, and Adelphia involve highly complex fraud investigations. 
Massive accounting frauds that artificially inflate corporate revenues to the 
tune of billions of dollars are crimes involving elaborate efforts to conceal. 
Corporate officials hid debt and manufactured revenue by making false 
entries, creating special purpose entities, and using other unorthodox 
accounting techniques.  
With the aid of Wall Street lawyers, accountants, and investment 
banks, Enron also devised tax shelters that enabled the corporation to 
avoid paying any taxes over a period of years, even though it booked 
billions of dollars of profits.74 The transactions were so complex that even 
the IRS did not understand them. Effective investigation of these 
transactions thus requires an enormous investment of time, money, and 
personnel, including forensic experts. To sort the intricacies out, 
investigators need the benefit of insiders’ knowledge of the corporate 
chain of command, the inner workings of the organization’s accounting 
system, and the day-to-day interactions among key players.  
27, 2002, at A3. Indeed, there were reports that plea negotiations between Mr. Sullivan and Justice 
Department lawyers broke down when the prosecutors insisted that he serve at least ten years in 
prison. Deborah Solomon, Jerry Markon & Susan Pulliam, Sullivan Indictment May Be Near, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at A3; Mike Claffey, Feds Indict WorldCom Executive, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 
29, 2002, News Section, at 9. Later reports suggested that plea negotiations may have resumed, but as 
of the date of this writing, there is no solid evidence that they have. 
 73. Former Controller of WorldCom Pleads Guilty to Fraud Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
2002, at C2; 2 Ex-Officials of WorldCom Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at C10. See infra 
text accompanying notes 76-78. 
 74. David Cay Johnston, Wall St. Firms Are Faulted in Report on Enron’s Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 14, 2003, at C1. According to a staff report issued by the Joint Committee on Taxation, Enron’s 
tax department functioned like a corporate business unit and had annual revenue targets. The tax 
shelter schemes were so aggressive that the front page of one deal known as the Steele Project bore the 
title “Show Me the Money!” Id. 
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As a practical matter, large-scale corporate accounting frauds require 
cooperative efforts among managers and their subordinates. Yet 
notwithstanding that high-level executives may have engineered the fraud, 
there will rarely be a paper trail that leads to the top. Just as the Enron and 
WorldCom whistleblowers went up the chain of command in reporting the 
fraud, corporate officials can use layers of bureaucracy to distance 
themselves from the acts of subordinates and keep their hands clean.75 
WorldCom is a case in point. Prosecutors are reportedly trying to 
determine whether CEO Bernard Ebbers had any role in the fraud.76 They 
hoped to obtain productive leads from the cooperating witnesses, all of 
whom said they falsified the company’s books on orders from high-level 
managers.77 But just how far up the line responsibility goes may be hard to 
resolve. According to WorldCom insiders, Ebbers delegated virtually 
everything. And notwithstanding that he was in charge of one of the 
world’s largest Internet companies, he was widely reputed to be a 
technophobe. He did not use e-mail, never took notes, and rarely used a 
computer. As one executive said, “[i]f people had questions for him, 
they’d fax them to his secretary and he’d call them back or scribble a 
reply.”78 He met mainly with top executives, and no minutes or records of 
meetings were kept. Thus, with no paper trail to follow, investigators face 
an uphill battle in their quest to learn “what did Ebbers know and when 
did he know it?”79 
This provides prosecutors an incentive to begin farther down the line. 
Because mid-level managers are most likely to be “hands on” when it 
comes to implementing the fraud, they are most likely to leave a traceable 
trail and are most vulnerable to criminal prosecution. Thus, without the 
 75. And while the Board of Directors may give unorthodox accounting methods a wink and a 
nod, their winks and nods will not be recorded in the corporate minutes. Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Beneficial Finance Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 82 (Mass. 1971) (“Criminal acts are not usually made the 
subject of votes of authorization or ratification by corporate Boards of Directors . . . . ”). 
 76. Former Controller of WorldCom Pleads Guilty to Fraud Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
2002, at C2; 2 Ex-Officials of WorldCom Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at C10. 
 77. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.  
 78. Jessica Hall, Ebbers Left Little Evidence; WorldCom CEO Always Low-Tech, HOUS. 
CHRON., Oct. 15, 2002, Business Section, at 4. But cf. Report of Investigation by the Special 
Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of WorldCom, Inc. (March 31, 2003) (finding, inter 
alia, clear evidence that Ebbers knew that WorldCom’s reported revenues were inflated through 
financial gimmickry). 
 79. While this article was in press, the Oklahoma Attorney General filed criminal charges against 
Ebbers, alleging that he violated state securities laws. The information also charged WorldCom, 
Sullivan, Myers, Vinson, and Normand with the same crimes. State v. WorldCom, Inc. (felony 
information filed in District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma) (Aug. 27, 2003) (on file with 
author). As of this writing, no federal criminal charges have been brought against Ebbers or 
WorldCom. 
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assistance of insiders to help connect the dots, the middle managers may 
end up as scapegoats while the higher-ups remain unscathed.  
D. Sarbanes-Oxley 
An offer of leniency can provide a strong incentive to become a 
cooperating witness. In exchange for a witness’s cooperation in the 
investigation, the prosecutor may agree not to prosecute the witness or 
another party,80 to reduce pending charges or charge fewer crimes,81 to 
 80. According to conventional wisdom, in his plea negotiations ImClone CEO Sam Waksal 
sought in vain to obtain the prosecutor’s agreement not to prosecute his father and daughter, or 
alternatively, not to seek prison sentences if they were criminally charged. They were implicated in the 
indictment as having conspired with Waksal and having lied under oath to the SEC. Andrew Pollack, 
U.S. Adds Charges Against Ex-Chief of Drug Company, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2002, at A1; Jerry 
Markon, Waksal’s Plea Talks Continue After Latest Deadline Extension, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2002, 
at B9. Although he eventually pled guilty to conspiracy, securities fraud, perjury, obstruction of justice 
and bank fraud charges, Waksal’s plea was not part of a negotiated agreement with the prosecutors, 
and he did not become a cooperating witness. Constance L. Hays, Ex-ImClone Chief Admits Some U.S. 
Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2002, at C1; Laurie P. Cohen & Jerry Markon, Waksal Plea Could 
Backfire, Lead to Hearing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2002, at C1. As of the date of this writing, no charges 
have been filed against the father or daughter. 
 81. For example, the prosecutor might agree to limit the number of counts charged against the 
defendant or to forego charging additional related crimes like filing false reports with the SEC. This 
may have been the case in the WorldCom prosecutions. David Myers, Betty Vinson, and James Brown 
were each charged in a criminal information with one count of conspiracy and one count of securities 
fraud, and Myers was charged with one count of false filings with the SEC. In contrast, while Scott 
Sullivan and Buford Yates were also charged with one count of conspiracy and one count of securities 
fraud, they were each charged with five counts of filing false statements with the SEC. United States v. 
Sullivan (indictment filed in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York) (Aug. 
28, 2002) (on file with author). Yates later struck a plea agreement under which he pled guilty to 
reduced charges that did not include the false filing counts. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71. 
 Prosecutors are sometimes publicly explicit about these matters. In the HealthSouth investigation, 
for example, the prosecutor’s pursuit of real-time prosecutions led to eleven guilty pleas by 
HealthSouth executives—including all five former CFO’s—in the short span of two months. Former 
Executive at HealthSouth Pleads Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2003, at C8. When the second guilty plea 
was announced, the prosecutor emphasized that it was important that other HealthSouth employees 
come forward soon. “People who do not cooperate will not see the small number of counts that are 
being charged against these individuals,” she said. Noting that the fraud continued for years, she 
cautioned that separate counts of wire fraud and false certification charges could be filed for each 
quarter in which false financial figures were used in SEC reports. Suspended HealthSouth Officer 
Pleads Guilty to Fraud, nbc13.com, Mar. 26, 2003, available at http://www.nbc13.com/ 
news/2065461/detail.html (on file with author). “We’re moving as swiftly as could be expected,” she 
said. “There’s a hole over at HealthSouth and you can climb deeper in it or you can do what you can to 
pull yourself out.” Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, New Charges Are Expected at HealthSouth, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2003, at C2. When the third guilty plea was announced, she again publicly 
encouraged other employees who were privy to the fraud to contact her office “to discuss how they can 
best ‘help themselves’” and noted that the investigation was expanding beyond HealthSouth’s finance 
department. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District Alabama, HealthSouth Officer 
Charged with Conspiracy to Commit Wire & Securities Fraud (Mar. 31, 2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/aln/pages/newsreleseasesmain.html (on file with author). As of August, 
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charge crimes that carry less severe punishment,82 or to recommend 
leniency in sentencing.83 Moreover, once the cooperation is complete, the 
prosecutor may ask the court for a downward departure from the 
applicable sentencing guideline if the witness has provided substantial 
assistance in the case.84 
That brings us back to Sarbanes-Oxley, which enhances criminal fraud 
penalties and directs the United States Sentencing Commission to revise 
the sentencing guidelines to require longer sentences for high-end fraud.85 
As shown in Table 1, Sarbanes-Oxley doubles the maximum prison term 
for securities fraud, quadruples the maximum term for mail and wire 
2003, fourteen HealthSouth executives had pled guilty, including the Senior Vice President for Tax 
and the Vice President of Investments. Another Guilty Plea in HealthSouth Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
29, 2003, at C2; HealthSouth Executive Admits to Falsifying Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at C7. 
See infra APPENDIX A, MAJOR CORPORATE FRAUD PROSECUTIONS, March 2002 - August 2003. While 
this Article was in press, a fifteenth executive pled guilty and became a cooperating witness. Ex-
Health South Official Agrees to Plea Deal in Massive Fraud, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Sept. 26, 2003 (on 
file with author). 
 82. In the ImClone case, for example, an assistant to a financial advisor at Merrill Lynch 
allegedly passed inside information relating to sales of ImClone stock to the financial advisor’s client. 
The client then sold nearly 4,000 shares of ImClone stock on the basis of the information. The assistant 
also lied to the SEC about whether he knew the reasons for the client’s sales. These facts, which are 
alleged in a one-count information charging the assistant, could have resulted in felony charges for 
insider trading and violating the false statements statute. As a cooperating witness, however, he was 
charged with and pled guilty to a misdemeanor for accepting money in consideration for withholding 
the truth from the SEC, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 873. United States v. Faneuil, 02-CR-1287 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2002) (Misdemeanor Information) (on file with author). 
 83. See generally U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.400 (2002). 
 84. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2002). The court considers a downward 
departure for providing substantial assistance independently of other mitigating factors such as 
acceptance of responsibility. Id. at Application Note 2. Providing substantial assistance to authorities is 
one of a very limited number of grounds on which the sentencing judge may reduce the sentence 
below the statutorily prescribed minimum and can only be considered upon the government’s motion. 
 85. Sarbanes-Oxley gave the Commission authority to exercise its emergency powers to adopt 
temporary amendments and imposed a six-month deadline for the Commission to act. The 
Commission adopted temporary amendments that became effective January 25, 2003 and will expire 
November 1, 2003, when permanent amendments come into place. The Commission submitted the 
permanent amendments for congressional review on May 1, 2003. U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, Part B: Submitted to Congress May 1, 2003. 
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fraud, and creates a new securities fraud offense authorizing an even 
longer maximum term.86  
 86. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1348 (West Supp. 2003). Section 1348, which is modeled on the mail fraud 
statute, is “more general and less technical” than the anti-fraud provisions in the securities laws and 
“should not be read to require proof of technical elements from the securities laws.” 148 CONG. REC. 
S7421 (daily ed. July 26, 2002).  
 Critics of Sarbanes-Oxley see its reliance on increased penalties as perhaps the weakest link in the 
chain. They reason that if corporate executives are not deterred by the prospect of five or ten years in 
prison, the threat of imprisonment will have little or no practical effect no matter what the maximum 
is. See, e.g., Perino, supra note 6, at 685, 687 (stating that economic analysis of crime and punishment 
suggests that Sarbanes-Oxley’s enhanced penalties are unlikely to deter corporate crime). Putting aside 
the question whether it is possible to deter greed, the ill-founded assumption is that Sarbanes-Oxlely’s 
higher penalties are only about deterrence. But that is surely not the case. Enron and WorldCom 
involve egregious frauds that are literally off the charts. The fraud in these two cases alone caused 
billions of dollars in shareholder losses, including employee pensions funded with now-worthless 
stock. The fraud precipitated the two largest corporate bankruptcies in our nation’s history, caused the 
loss of tens of thousands of jobs, harmed the economy, and destroyed investor confidence. In view of 
the magnitude of the harm and the lack of justification for bringing it about, the architects of Sarbanes-
Oxley might reasonably have concluded that higher authorized penalties are needed to reflect the 
gravity of egregious high-end fraud.  
 Fraud on this scale provokes moral outrage that is often expressed by the enactment of new laws 
that condemn it. In response to the Savings and Loan scandals of the 1990’s, for example, Congress 
increased the maximum penalty for mail and wire fraud to thirty years in prison and a $1 million fine if 
the fraud affected a financial institution, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1343 (West Supp. 2003), and enacted a 
bank fraud statute authorizing the same severe punishment. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 2000). Section 
1344 is modeled on the mail fraud statute. Congress also enacted special statutes that: (1) punish 
obstructing the examination or investigation of a financial institution, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1510(b)(1) (West 
2000) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1517 (West 2000); (2) made financial institution fraud a RICO predicate 
crime, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003); (3) enacted a continuing financial crimes 
enterprise statute based on the drug kingpin law, compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 225 (West 2000) (continuing 
financial crimes enterprise statute) with 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(c) (West 1999) (continuing criminal 
enterprise statute); and (4) authorized civil and criminal forfeitures for some financial institution 
crimes. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(1)(C)-(E) (West Supp. 2003); 18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(2)-(4) (West 
2000). See generally 2 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY Chapter 8A (2d ed. 
1992). 
 As is true of Sarbanes-Oxley’s criminal provisions, the financial institution crimes enacted in the 
wake of the Savings and Loan scandals ensure the availability of meaningful criminal penalties for the 
truly egregious case and, as a practical matter, can significantly influence pre-indictment strategies 
adopted by those who may become targets of a criminal investigation.  
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Table 1 
Comparison Of Criminal Fraud Penalties 
FRAUD OFFENSE FORMER 
MAXIMUM 
TERM 
CURRENT 
MAXIMUM 
TERM 
FORMER 
MAXIMUM FINE 
CURRENT 
MAXIMUM 
FINE 
 
SECURITIES FRAUD 
   (15 U.S.C. § 78FF) 
 
10 years 
 
20 years 
 
$1,000,000/ 
$2,500,000 
(org.) 
 
$5,000,000/ 
$25,000,000 
(org.) 
 
SECURITIES FRAUD 
   (18 U.S.C. § 1348) 
   (NEW) 
 
_____ 
 
25 years 
 
_____ 
 
$250,000/ 
$500,000 
(org.) 
 
MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD 
   (18 U.S.C . §§ 1341, 
   1343) 
 
      AFFECTING A  
      FINANCIAL  
      INSTITUTION 
 
5 years 
 
 
 
30 years 
 
20 years 
 
 
 
30 years 
 
$250,000/ 
$500,000 (org.)  
 
 
$1,000,000 
 
$250,000/ 
$500,000 
(org.) 
 
$1,000,000 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley also adds a new criminal conspiracy statute that 
significantly increases authorized penalties for conspiracy to commit mail 
fraud, wire fraud, securities fraud,87 and financial reporting fraud.88 
Because the new provision supplements rather than supplants the general 
federal conspiracy statute,89 the government can charge defendants under 
either statute in an accounting or securities fraud prosecution.  
The prosecutor’s decision regarding which statute to invoke will have 
considerable practical significance for the target of the investigation 
because of differences in penalty structures. While the general conspiracy 
statute provides a fixed maximum fine and term of imprisonment,90 the 
 87. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1348 (West Supp. 2003).  
 88. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West Supp. 2003). The new conspiracy statute applies to all offenses 
defined in Chapter 63 of Title 18, but the offenses enumerated in the text are the most relevant to this 
discussion. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1349 (West Supp. 2003). Section 1349 also makes some attempts 
punishable as independent crimes. There is no criminal attempt provision of general applicability in 
the federal criminal code. 
 89. The general federal conspiracy statute is codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West 2000).  
 90. An exception to the fixed punishment scheme in § 371 keys the maximum punishment for 
conspiring to commit a crime that is classified as a misdemeanor to the maximum penalty for the 
misdemeanor itself. 
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maximum penalty for a Sarbanes-Oxley conspiracy is the punishment 
authorized for committing the object offense.91 Table 2 illustrates how 
substantial the difference can be. 
Table 2  
Criminal Conspiracy Penalties 
Applicable To Individuals 
CONSPIRACY TO MAXIMUM PRISON TERM MAXIMUM FINE 
COMMIT 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371 
18 U.S.C. 
§ 1349 
18 U.S.C. 
§ 371 
18 U.S.C. 
§ 1349 
 
MAIL FRAUD 
   (18 U.S.C. § 1341) 
5 years 20 years $250,000 $   250,000 
     AFFECTING A 
      FINANCIAL 
      INSTITUTION 
5 years 30 years $250,000 $1,000,000 
WIRE FRAUD 
   (18 U.S.C. § 1343) 
5 years 20 years $250,000 $   250,000 
     AFFECTING A 
      FINANCIAL 
      INSTITUTION 
5 years 30 years $250,000 $1,000,000 
BANK FRAUD 
   (18 U.S.C. § 1344) 
5 years 30 years $250,000 $1,000,000 
SECURITIES FRAUD 
   (18 U.S.C. § 1348) 
5 years 25 years $250,000 $   250,000 
FINANCIAL 
REPORTING FRAUD 
   (18 U.S.C. § 1350) 
5 years 10 years $250,000 $1,000,000 
     WILLFUL 
      VIOLATION 
5 years 20 years $250,000 $5,000,000 
 91. A minor substantive difference between the two provisions is that while conspiracies 
prosecuted under the general conspiracy statute require proof of an overt act, Sarbanes-Oxley 
conspiracies do not. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13-17 (1994) (overt act requirement is 
a departure from common law; proof of an overt act is not required unless the conspiracy statute 
explicitly requires it).  
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Contrary to popular lore,92 Sarbanes-Oxley’s increased penalties will 
result in the imposition of substantially longer prison terms because of 
corresponding changes in the federal sentencing guidelines:93  
 A mandatory six level enhancement for any fraud offense that 
affects 250 or more victims will increase the minimum sentence 
for major fraud by about 25%.94 
 Substantial enhancements in the sentence imposed for fraud 
offenses that endanger the solvency or financial security of a 
substantial number of victims or a publicly traded company can 
as much as triple the guideline sentence.95 
 The sentence for officers or directors of publicly traded 
companies who are convicted of securities violations will 
increase by about 50% based solely on their status as 
fiduciaries.96 If the offense also endangers the financial security 
of the company or economically harms a substantial number of 
victims, an additional increase in the guideline sentence will be 
imposed. 
 The amendments provide dramatic increases in offense levels for 
crimes that cause catastrophic economic loss. The amended loss 
table adds a 28 level increase for offenses that involve more than 
$200 million and a 30 level increase for offenses involving more 
than $400 million. This will increase the minimum sentence for 
high-end fraud by more than 5 years.97 
As these amendments to the guidelines illustrate, the statutory increases 
in fraud penalties are no idle threat. Consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
renewed emphasis on personal accountability, they will translate into 
 92. See, e.g., Perino, supra, note 6, at 685 (claiming that Sarbanes-Oxley’s penalty enhancements 
are unlikely to change expected penalties because they merely set an outside limit on sentences and 
play a minor role under the sentencing guidelines); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding 
Economic Crime Reform After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 387 (2003) 
(claiming that Sarbanes-Oxley’s quadrupling of the maximum penalty for mail and wire fraud is an 
empty gesture that is unlikely to change actual sentences imposed). 
 93. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. But cf. Perino, supra note 6, at 686-87 (stating that 
it is unlikely that the Sentencing Commission’s review of sentence enhancements will yield substantial 
changes in the guidelines). 
 94. SUPPLEMENT TO 2002 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(2) (effective Jan. 
25, 2003). 
 95. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(12)(B). 
 96. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(14). 
 97. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1).  
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substantially more time served. That being true, Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
enhanced penalties, when combined with the realities of guidelines 
sentencing, provide a powerful incentive for targets of major 
investigations to enter into cooperation agreements with the government. 
CONCLUSION 
Sarbanes-Oxley undoubtedly will not be the last word on corporate 
governance reform or punishing criminal fraud. There are no simple 
solutions to a culture of deceit fueled by greed, mismanagement, conflicts 
of interest, and failure of professional and regulatory oversight. But 
Sarbanes-Oxley is a constructive step in the right direction. It may fall 
short, but it sends an unmistakably clear signal that this should never 
happen again. 
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